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致：

中华人民共和国生态环境部部长

《生物多样性公约》第 15 次缔约方大会（cop15）主席

黄润秋先生

抄送：

中华人民共和国生态环境部、国家发展和改革委员会、商务部、国务院国有资产监督管理委员会、银行保险监督管理委员会、中国银行业协会、中国国家开发银行、中国进出口银行、中国银行、中国工商银行、中国建设银行、中国交通银行、中国农业银行、中国邮政储蓄银行、中国招商银行、中国光大银行、中国兴业银行、中国出口信用保险公司、中国再保险、“一带一路”绿色发展国际联盟秘书处

主题：保证中国高质量对外投资活动，推动生物多样性保护

尊敬的 COP15 主席黄润秋：

您好！

我们是来自全球几乎每个地区的 90 家社会组织。您是联合国《生物多样性公约》第 15 次缔约方大会 (COP15) 的主席，所以我们给您写信。本次会议的结果将影响到我们的子孙后代。人们日益认识到，生物多样性丧失是与气候变化同等严峻的全球性挑战，把经济增长作为优先事项而牺牲环境的发展模式与实践，导致并加剧了这些全球性危机，人类活动对于直接推动全球范围的物种灭绝难辞其咎。因此，我们希望中国提供世界所需的政治领导力，以遏止不可持续的发展模式，使人类在科学家们称为“第六次物种大灭绝”的迷途上悬崖勒马。

中国担任 COP15 主席国，为参与对外投资活动的中资实体提供了不可多得的契机，以协助恢复重大生态系统、终止并逆转生物多样性危机。**我们请求参与对外投资的中资实体，践行国家承诺，把生物多样性和环境保护作为优先事项。**

我们也请求包括中国生态环境部在内的相关监管机构，确保中资实体--尤其是银行和企业，在全球开发项目的筛选、规划和实施过程中，了解生物多样性并将其作为优先事项考虑。鉴于中国对外投资的增长，中资银行和企业满足国际及中国有关保护生物多样性、人民和环境的政策期望至关重要。

中国政策对生物多样性保护的承诺

2021 年 10 月，在昆明举行的 COP15 第一阶段会议上，习近平主席声明，生物多样性“是人类生存和发展的基础……我们要加快形成绿色发展方式，促进经济发展和环境保护双赢，构建经济与环境协同共进的地球家园”¹。自 2013 年起，中国不同政府部门发布了有关境外项目加强环境和生物多样性保护的政策与指引。很明显，生物多样性保护是中国对外投资政策中的重大、首要主题。

这是一个积极的趋势，因为大部分国家还没有建立广泛指导及管理其境外活动的政策框架。最近，生态环境部和商务部联合印发了《对外投资合作建设项目生态环境保护指南》和《对外投资合作绿色发展工作指引》。这些新政策为企业在整个项目周期中减少环境影响提供了应当遵循的有益指南，比如进行生物多样性调查、必要时考虑重新选址、采用国际标准来防范环境和社会风险等。

此外，国家发展和改革委员会 2022 年印发的《关于推进共建“一带一路”绿色发展的意见》，就高度重视当地民众生态环保诉求、减少对保护区及生态敏感脆弱区的影响提供了重要指引。该政策还进一步明确了如何落实习近平主席在 2021 年作出的中国不再新建境外煤电项目、大力支持发展中国家绿色低碳能源发展的声明。鉴于煤炭和化石燃料项目不仅对环境、气候和社会有害，还可能对生物多样性产生不利影响，这一声明表明中国能够退出支持那些已被充分证明有害于环境和气候的行业。

中国银行业在生物多样性保护中的角色

《生物多样性公约》秘书处指出，生物多样性保护面临的关键挑战，是“找到激励保护和可持续利用的经济政策，这些经济政策能创造财政机制来激励本来会过度使用或损害资源的人”²。要保证经济政策保护生物多样性，很重要的一点是，银行必须共同建立和支持恰当合理的“财政激励机制”来预防过度利用或损害资源。在支持对外投资活动时，中资银行可以加强审批、拒绝拨付并防范资金流向低质量的、对生物多样性产生负面影响的活动。

作为上游实体，中资银行可以结合正向激励和反向约束等金融措施，优先支持可持续的活动，从而可以对生物多样性和环境保护产生重大影响。然而，中资银行曾参与争议性项目的往绩，表明其需要做出进一步努力，不但要加强对客户的问责，若银

¹ 全文 | 习近平在《生物多样性公约》第十五次缔约方大会领导人峰会上的主旨讲话。2021 年 10 月 12 日 https://www.cop15news.com/focus/2021-10/12/c_1211401336.htm

² “Sustaining life on Earth How the Convention on Biological Diversity promotes nature and human well-being”, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, April 2000. <https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-sustain-en.pdf>

行支持了对环境和生物多样性产生不利影响的活动，也要对自身问责³。例如，一项研究发现，一带一路相关的线性基础设施将会影响 32 个保护区、40 个生物多样性关键区域和 26 个极危物种⁴。

目前尚未有中资银行制定或发布机构层面的生物多样性相关政策。然而，有积极迹象表明，中资银行逐渐认识到生物多样性保护的重要性。例如，2021 年，中国各大政策和商业银行都加入了推动加强生物多样性风险管理、披露和表现的《银行业金融机构支持生物多样性保护共同宣示》⁵。

此外，2022 年发布的《银行业保险业绿色金融指引》，标志着中国绿色金融政策的新高点。该指引包含多项风险管理、信息披露和利益相关方要求，有助于预防和管理生物多样性问题。尤其重要的是，《指引》要求银行在信贷合同中订立环境和社会承诺条款以及相关救济条款(第 21 条)；就违反绿色金融规定对银行员工问责(第 26 条)；建立利益相关方沟通机制和申诉渠道(第 14 条)；并避免“高耗能、高排放、低水平项目”(第 12 条)。

如果实施得当，这些要求有助于确保中资银行在授信和投资的所有阶段筛查并过滤掉不利于生物多样性的活动。同时，令人欣慰的是，上述指引认可了所有利益相关方(包括民间社会和受影响社区)可以发挥作用，告知中资银行其在境外所产生的影响并就此与之互动。有了《绿色金融指引》、《绿色信贷实施情况关键评价指标》以及其他积极的绿色金融政策，中资银行现在应该有足够的必要指导信息，帮助其识别并避免对环境和生物多样性产生不利影响的活动。

令人鼓舞的是，我们注意到了中资银行从具有严重生物多样性影响的争议性项目中退出的确切例证。比如，2020 年，中国工商银行确认不再参与肯尼亚的拉姆(Lamu)火电站项目。一旦建成，这一项目将会对拉姆的世界遗产地及其周围脆弱的海洋生态体系产生不良影响。2019 年，在国际社会表达了对世界上极端濒危类人猿

³ “Under the spotlight: Chinese banks' risky agribusiness portfolio”, Global Witness, June 7, 2021. <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/forests/under-spotlight-chinese-banks-risky-agribusiness-portfolio/>; Erik Koons, “Chinese Banks Risk their Reputation With Investments in Coal”, Energy Tracker Asia, May 18, 2021. <https://energytracker.asia/chinese-banks-risk-their-reputation-with-investments-in-coal/>; “Dams Built by China”, International Rivers. <https://archive.internationalrivers.org/taxonomy/term/1045>; “Risks to Global Biodiversity and Indigenous Lands from China’s Overseas Development Finance”, Boston University, September 20, 2021. <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/09/20/risks-to-global-biodiversity-and-indigenous-lands-from-chinas-overseas-development-finance/>; Rebecca Ray and Blake Alexander Simmons, “Tracking China’s Overseas Development Finance”, Boston University, December 7, 2020. <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2020/12/07/tracking-chinas-overseas-development-finance/>; “Chinese state-owned company accused of endangering rare orang-utans”, Financial Times, June 18, 2022. <https://www.ft.com/content/b15d75ea-cced-4204-8540-912f9e693a5e>

⁴ Li Shuen Ng, et al, “The scale of biodiversity impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia”, Biological Conservation, Volume 248, August 2020. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0006320720307497?via%3Dihub>

⁵ 《银行业金融机构支持生物多样性保护共同宣示》，中国银行业杂志，October 20, 2021. <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/k7Rx9imfJAWSY08ZO06TQQ>

打巴努里猩猩 (Tapanuli orangutan) 的担忧后，中国银行撤销了对印尼巴丹托鲁 (Batang Toru) 大坝的支持。另外一个很好的例子是 2016 年中国进出口银行从蒙古国的额根河 (Egiin Gol) 水电站项目撤资。这一项目若建成，将会影响濒危鲑科鱼在蒙古国的栖息地，以及位于俄罗斯的世界遗产贝加尔湖。遗憾的是，这些积极的案例仍只是例外，而非常态。例如，虽然中国银行撤出了巴丹托鲁大坝，国家开发投资公司 (简称“国投”) 却悄悄买下了这一项目，令人担忧该项目可能在中方支持下继续推进，危及打巴努里猩猩的生存⁶。

保护生物多样性时承认土著和社区权利至关重要

土著和当地社区在保护生物多样性方面所起到的重要作用，正日益得到认可。生物多样性和生态系统服务政府间科学-政策平台 (IPBES) 指出，“有土著和当地社区参与的治理，包括习俗制度与管理体制和共同管理机制，通过纳入因地制宜的管理系统与土著和地方知识，可以成为保护自然及其对人类贡献的有效方式”。⁷ 此外，尽管土著仅占世界人口的 5%，却保护着世界上现存生物多样性的 80%⁸。

然而，研究表明，中国对外投资对土著的土地保护和当地居民带来了风险。一项研究发现，“63%的中国出资项目与关键栖息地、保护区或土著土地重叠，世界上多达 24% 的受威胁鸟类、哺乳动物、爬行动物和两栖动物都可能受到这些项目的影响。风险热点主要分布在撒哈拉以南的非洲北部、东南亚以及南美部分地区。总体而言，与世界银行相比，中国的开发项目造成的风险更大，尤其在能源领域。”⁹。

确保“互利”和“共赢”，是中国对外政策的一项核心原则。然而中资银行与企业尚未要求以人权为本的方法 (rights-based approaches) 与土著和当地社区互动，更未将此常规化。比如，尚未有任何中资银行要求其客户在与土著和当地社区互动中使用自由、事先、知情同意流程 (FPIC)。虽然中国绿色金融政策日益认识到与利益相关方沟通交流的重要性，但中资银行与企业仍很不透明，对公众发来的信件或其他信息经常置之不理，甚至拒收。

中资银行和公司要成功实现生物多样性相关目标，就要建立透明、公开的机制，与民间社会和受影响社区等利益相关方沟通和互动，这与习近平主席提出的“国际

⁶ “Chinese state-owned company accused of endangering rare orang-utans”, Financial Times, June 18, 2022. <https://www.ft.com/content/b15d75ea-cced-4204-8540-912f9e693a5e>

⁷ “Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services”, Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, 2019. <https://ipbes.net/global-assessment>

⁸ Gleb Raygorodetsky, “Indigenous peoples defend Earth's biodiversity—but they're in danger”, National Geographic, November 19, 2018. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/can-indigenous-land-stewardship-protect-biodiversity->

⁹ “Risks to Global Biodiversity and Indigenous Lands from China’s Overseas Development Finance”, Boston University, September 20, 2021. <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/09/20/risks-to-global-biodiversity-and-indigenous-lands-from-chinas-overseas-development-finance/>

社会要加强合作，心往一处想，劲往一处使，共建地球生命共同体”一脉相承。作为国际社会的重要成员，中资银行和企业是国际社会的一部分，因此应该作出进一步的努力，来帮助建设一个造福地球上所有社区的生命共同体。

展望未来

基于上述考虑，我们随信附上一些中资机构正在考虑或开发的项目清单。在我们看来，这些项目就其目前的状况而言，是生物多样性风险高、质量低的明显例证。

我们希望中国展现负责任大国的领导力，在全球发展和生物多样性保护中作出表率。许多“一带一路”项目已经在重要和敏感的生物多样性地区实施或计划实施，因此，以强有力的措施执行上述政府政策，对于中国实现建设“绿色一带一路”的承诺、确保其境外项目确实保护环境、生物多样性和当地人民至关重要。

我们因此提出下列建议，希望能够帮助鼓励中资实体在其对外活动中减少对生物多样性的潜在不利影响。

中国金融机构、开发商以及项目发起人应当：

- 全面遵守中国有关境外项目环境、社会和生物多样性保护的政策，包括上述各项指引、指导意见以及国际规范和最佳实践；
- 制定和实施强有力的生物多样性保护政策；
- 有效开展相关尽职调查，并要求使用与国际标准相符的严格、可信、全面和透明的环境影响评价和生物多样性研究，评价所有可行替代方案并计入累积影响；
- 尊重土著和当地社区的权利；
- 要求磋商过程按照自由、事先、知情同意 (FPIC) 标准进行，并在整个项目周期中进行包容性决策；
- 在机构层面建立易用、清晰和有效的沟通渠道；
- 制定并实施强有力的信息披露和透明政策；
- 遵循 2022 年《银行业保险业绿色金融指引》，制定和实施适用于所有当地利益相关方、公平有效的项目层面的申诉渠道和机构层面的申诉机制；
- 禁止直接或间接资助任何可能对高生物多样性地区产生负面影响和引起其退化的不可持续的、有害的活动。高生物多样性地区包括但不限于：国际和国家承认的高生物多样性地区、受威胁和特有物种的栖息地、生物多样性关键区域、自由流淌河流、原始森林和脆弱的次生林、受威胁的海洋和沿海保护地区，以及标志性的跨国生态系统（如亚马逊、北极、艾伯丁裂谷等）；

- 禁止直接或间接资助已被充分证明会引发并加剧有害环境、生物多样性和社会影响的行业，根据生物多样性和生态系统服务政府间科学-政策平台 (IPBES) 的研究发现，这些行业包括但不限于化石燃料、大型水电和工业化农业等¹⁰；
- 将中国不开发、支持或建设任何新的或已规划的境外煤电相关项目和活动的承诺制度化；
- 禁止可能影响具有高生物多样性的关键生态系统的有害开发活动及直接或间接融资。这些生态系统包括原始森林和脆弱的次生林、自由流淌河流、受威胁的海洋及沿海生态系统、国际和国家保护区、濒危和/或特有物种栖息地、生物多样性关键区域、标志性跨国生态系统，以及未获得土著和当地社区自由、事先、知情同意的地区；通过设立禁区来保护生物多样性的方法符合中国的生态保护红线制度。

中国有关政府机构（包括金融监管机构）应当：

- 确保中资金融机构、开发商和项目发起人遵守中国有关境外项目中环境、社会和生物多样性保护的政策；
- 确保建立社区与中国监管机构和政府部门沟通交流的易用、清晰和有效渠道；
- 要求中国金融机构、开发商和项目发起人改善并加强信息披露和透明政策与实践，包括建立有效、易用的沟通渠道；
- 要求中国金融机构、开发商和项目发起人建立有效的项目层面的申诉机制和机构层面的问责机制；
- 禁止中国金融机构、开发商和项目发起人直接或间接资助任何可能对高生物多样性地区产生负面影响和引起其退化的不可持续的、有害的活动。高生物多样性地区包括但不限于：国际和国家承认的高生物多样性地区、受威胁和特有物种的栖息地、生物多样性关键区域、自由流淌河流、原始森林和脆弱的次生林、受威胁的海洋和沿海保护地区，以及标志性的跨国生态系统 (如亚马逊、北极、艾伯丁裂谷等)；
- 将保护和尊重土著和当地社区的权利全面纳入管理中国对外投资、开发和承包活动的政策框架中，使其成为一项基础性原则，并要求磋商过程按照自由、事先、知情同意 (FPIC) 标准进行；

¹⁰ Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services”, Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, 2019. <https://ipbes.net/global-assessment>

- 加强监管体系，制定和建立惩罚机制，当中国金融机构、开发商、项目发起人和承包商在对外活动中没有有效回应和应对其环境、生物多样性和社会不利影响时，对其进行处罚；
- 禁止中国金融机构、开发商和项目发起人直接或间接资助已被充分证明引发并加剧有害环境、生物多样性和社会影响的行业，根据生物多样性和生态系统服务政府间科学-政策平台 (IPBES) 的研究发现，这些行业包括但不限于化石燃料、大型水电和工业化农业等¹¹；
- 禁止可能影响具有高生物多样性的关键生态系统的有害开发活动以及直接和间接融资。这些生态系统包括原始森林和脆弱的次生林、自由流淌河流、受威胁的海洋及沿海生态系统、国际和国家保护区、濒危和/或特有物种栖息地、生物多样性关键区域、标志性跨国生态系统，以及未获得土著和当地社区自由、事先、知情同意的地区；通过设立禁区来保护生物多样性的方法符合中国的生态保护红线制度。

我们在此向您和其他 COP15 参会国预祝第二阶段会议富有成效，并感谢您花时间去阅读我们的信件。如果您想了解所列项目更详尽的信息，或想就本信中任何细节与我们讨论，我们可随时提供或安排。烦请您通过此电邮 csosforbiodiversity@gmail.com 确认收悉此函。我们十分期待您的反馈意见！

此致

敬礼

1. NGO 350 Côte d'Ivoire, 象牙海岸共和国
2. A Rocha Ghana, 加纳
3. AbibiNsroma Foundation, 加纳
4. Africa Coalition for Corporate Accountability, 非洲
5. Africa Institute for Energy Governance, 乌干达/非洲
6. African Law Foundation, 尼日利亚
7. Amazon Watch, 全球性组织
8. Angir nuden Munduuhuu NGO, 蒙古国
9. AnsvarligFremtid, 丹麦
10. Australian Forests and Climate Alliance, 澳大利亚
11. Balkanka Association Sofia, 保加利亚

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12. Bank Information Center, 美国
13. BankTrack, 全球性组织
14. Buliisa Initiative for Rural Development Organisation, 乌干达
15. Captured In Africa Foundation, 南非
16. Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development, 菲律宾
17. Central and Eastern Europe Bankwatch Network, 中欧和东欧
18. Centre de Défense des Droits de l'Homme et Démocratie, 刚果民主共和国
19. Centre for Natural Resource Governance, Zimbabwe
20. Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia, 玻利维亚
21. Centro de Documentación en Derechos Humanos, 厄瓜多尔/拉美地区
22. Centro de Información sobre Empresas y Derechos Humanos, 哥伦比亚
23. Centro de Políticas Públicas y Derechos Humanos, 秘鲁
24. Colectivo sobre Financiamiento e Inversiones China Derechos Humanos y Ambiente, 拉美地区
25. Coletivo Proteja, 巴西 (亚马孙州)
26. Committee for Peace and Development Advocacy, 利比里亚/西非地区
27. Community Resource Centre, 泰国
28. Conservation Action Trust, 印度
29. Consumers' Association of Penang, 马来西亚
30. CooperAcción, 秘鲁
31. Derecho Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, 秘鲁
32. Early Warning System, 智利
33. Earthlife Africa, 南非
34. EarthRights International, 全球性组织
35. Elephanatics, 加拿大
36. Enda Lead Afrique Francophone, 塞内加尔
37. Equitable Cambodia, 柬埔寨
38. Foundation for the Conservation of the Earth , 尼日利亚
39. Friends of the Earth Australia, 澳大利亚
40. Friends of the Earth Colombia/CENSAT, 哥伦比亚
41. Friends of the Earth Indonesia/WALHI, 印度尼西亚
42. Friends of the Earth Mexico/Otros Mundos, 墨西哥
43. Friends of the Earth Malaysia/ Sahabat Alam Malaysia, 马来西亚
44. Friends of the Earth US, 美国
45. Friends with Environment in Development, 乌干达
46. Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, 阿根廷
47. GegenStroemung – CounterCurrent, 德国
48. Global March for Elephants and Rhinos, 美国
49. Gobi Soil NGO, 蒙古国
50. Green Advocates International, 利比里亚
51. Green Development Advocates, 喀麦隆
52. Inclusive Development International, 美国
53. Indus Consortium, 巴基斯坦
54. Inkrispena, 印度尼西亚

55. Innoeva Development Foundation, 全球性组织
56. Institute for Ecology and Action Anthropology, 德国
57. Institute of Sustainable Development, 马拉维
58. International Rivers, 美国
59. Kanan Derechos Humanos, 墨西哥
60. Kanopi Hijau Indonesia, 印度尼西亚
61. Lamu Youth Alliance, 肯尼亚
62. Latinoamérica Sustentable, 厄瓜多尔/ 拉美地区
63. Laudato Si Movement- Africa, 非洲
64. Le Groupe de Recherche et de Plaidoyer sur les Industries Extractives, 象牙海岸共和国
65. Mekong Watch, 日本
66. Mizu Eco-Care, 赞比亚
67. Mouvement Ecologique, 卢森堡
68. Natural Resource Women Platform, 利比里亚
69. NGO Forum on ADB, 菲律宾
70. Observatoire congolais pour la Gouvernance Locale, 刚果民主共和国
71. Observatoire d'Etudes et d'Appui à la Responsabilité Sociale et Environnementale, 刚果民主共和国
72. Observatorio Latinoamericano de Conflictos Ambientales, 智利
73. ONG Ecosistemas, 智利
74. Oyu Tolgoi Watch, 蒙古国
75. 巴基斯坦 Fisherfolk Forum, 巴基斯坦
76. Pan African Sanctuary Alliance, 非洲地区及美国
77. Peace Point Development Foundation, 尼日利亚
78. Psychological Responsiveness NGO, 蒙古国
79. Public Interest Law Center Chad, 乍得
80. Réseau Camerounais des Organisations des Droits de l'Homme, 喀麦隆
81. Rivers Without Boundaries, 蒙古国
82. Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition, 全球性组织
83. Save Lamu, 肯尼亚
84. Save Virunga, 全球性组织
85. Stichting Onderzoek Multinational Ondernemingen, 荷兰
86. Strategic Youth Network for Development, 加纳
87. Sustentarse, 智利
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抄送：

中华人民共和国生态环境部

赵英民副部长

自然生态保护司崔书红司长

国际合作司司长周国梅

国际合作司生态环境公约处处长 Chen Haijun (《生物多样性公约》中华人民共和国国家联络点)

自然生态保护司生物多样性保护处处长 Jing Xin (传统知识和保护区中华人民共和国国家联络点)

对外合作与交流中心主任张玉军、副主任李永红

中华人民共和国北京市东城区东长安街 12 号 100006

mailbox01@mee.gov.cn / advice@mee.gov.cn / chen.haijun@mee.gov.cn /
jing.xin@mee.gov.cn

中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员会

何立峰主任

外资司孔令龙司长

推进“一带一路”建设工作领导小组办公室对外事务协调推进组组长 应雄

中华人民共和国北京市西城区月坛南街 38 号 100824

ndrc@ndrc.gov.cn / bgt@ndrc.gov.cn

中华人民共和国商务部

王文涛部长

对外投资与经济合作司司长王胜文

西亚非洲事务司司长江伟

中华人民共和国北京东城区长安东大街 2 号 100731

Xyf3@mofcom.gov.cn / Waa@mofcom.gov.cn / hzs@mofcom.gov.cn /
wangshengwen@mofcom.gov.cn / Xyf1@mofcom.gov.cn / Waa2@mofcom.gov.cn /
Xietiaochu@mofcom.gov.cn

国务院国有资产监督管理委员会

郝鹏主任

service@sasac.gov.cn / iecc@sasac.gov.cn

中国银行保险监督管理委员会

郭树清主席

政策研究局叶

国际部主任廖媛媛

中华人民共和国北京市西城区金融街 15 号 100033

sqxx@cbirc.gov.cn

中国银行业协会

专职副会长潘光伟

中华人民共和国北京市西城区金融街 20 号交通银行大厦 B 座 100033

cba.china@china-cba.net

中国国家开发银行

赵欢董事长、欧阳卫民行长

中华人民共和国北京市西城区复兴门内大街 18 号 100031

csr@cdb.cn / webmaster@cdb.cn

中国进出口银行

吴富林董事长、行长任生俊

中华人民共和国北京市西城区复兴门内大街 30 号 100031

csr@eximbank.gov.cn

中国银行

刘连舸董事长、刘金行长

中华人民共和国北京复兴门内大街 1 号 100140

ir@bankofchina.com / investor_relations@bochk.com / csr@bochk.com /
corp_comm@bochk.com / csr@bankofchina.com

中国工商银行

陈四清董事长、廖林行长

中华人民共和国北京市西城区复兴门内大街 11 号 100140

ir@icbc.com.cn / icbchk@icbcasia.com / csr@icbc.com.cn / icbc.africa@gmail.com

中国建设银行

田国立董事长、张金良行长

中华人民共和国北京西城区金融大街 25 号 100033

ir@ccb.cn / csr@ccb.cn

中国农业银行

谷澍董事长

中华人民共和国北京东城区建国门内大街 69 号 100005

ir@abchina.com / csr@abchina.com

中国交通银行

任德奇董事长、刘珺行长

中华人民共和国上海浦东新区银城中路 188 号 200120

investor@bankcomm.com / auditcommittee@bankcomm.com

中国邮政储蓄银行

刘建军代理董事长、行长

中华人民共和国北京市西城区金融大街 3 号 100808

psbc.ir@psbcoa.com.cn

中国招商银行

缪建民董事长、王良行长

中华人民共和国深圳市福田区深南大道 7088 号 招商银行大厦

xfzts@cmbchina.com / office@cmbchina.com / cmb@cmbchina.com

中国兴业银行

吕家进董事长、陶以平行长

中华人民共和国东路 154 号中山大厦 A 座 27 楼, 350003

sustainability@cib.com.cn / irm@cib.com.cn

中国光大银行

王江董事长、吴利军总经理

中华人民共和国北京市西城区太平桥大街 25 号、甲 25 号中国光大中心 100033

IR@cebbank.com

中国出口信用保险公司

宋曙光董事长、盛和泰总经理

中华人民共和国北京市西城区丰汇园 11 号丰汇时代大厦 100033

webmaster@sinosure.com.cn / dyyyb@sinosure.com.cn / dsyyb@sinosure.com.cn / ii-dept@sinosure.com.cn

中国再保险

和春雷董事长、庄乾志总裁

北京市西城区金融街 11 号中国再保险大厦 100033

IR@chinare.com.cn

“一带一路”绿色发展国际联盟秘书处
brigc@fecomee.org.cn / brigcsecretariat@163.com

附录 1: 项目清单

当地社区和组织对以下中国境外项目和活动的环境、社会、气候以及/或生物多样性影响表达了担忧。附录 2 对这些项目作出了简短描述。

1. Dabar Hydropower Plant, Bosnia and Herzegovina
2. Erdeneburen Dam, Mongolia
3. Ghana Integrated Bauxite Development Project, Ghana
4. Koukoutamba Dam, Guinea
5. 1320 SSRL Thar Coal Block-I 7.8mtpa & Power Plant Electric), Pakistan
6. Project Gran Buriticá S.A.S. (Buriticá mine), Colombia
7. Mirador Large-scale Mining Project, Ecuador
8. San Carlos-Panantza Mining Project, Ecuador
9. Río Blanco Mining Project, Ecuador
10. Las Bambas Mining Project, Peru
11. Marcona Mine, Peru
12. Toromocho Mining Unit, Peru
13. Hydroelectric complex on the Santa Cruz River, Argentina
14. Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric Project, Ecuador
15. Ivirizu Hydroelectric Project, Bolivia
16. São Manoel Hydroelectric Dam, Brazil
17. Rucalhue Hydroelectric Power Plant, Chile
18. Drilling and Exploitation of the Ishpingo Field, Block 43- ITT, Ecuador
19. Orinoco Oil Belt, Venezuela
20. Mayan Train Project, Mexico
21. Dumestre Hydrobiological Resources Processing Plant, Chile
22. Dairi Prima Mineral Mine, Indonesia
23. Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park , Indonesia
24. Amazarsky Saw and Paper Mill and Loguhe-Pokrovka Border Crossing, Russia
25. Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant and Kidunda Dam Water Supply Project, Tanzania
26. Northern Sea Route Oil, Gas and Mining Projects, Russia
27. Power of Siberia-II (Soyz-Vostok) Gas Pipeline (Pipeline Russia-Mongolia-China), Russia, Mongolia and China
28. Zashulansky Coal Mine, Russia
29. “Blue Horse” Program of Mongolia: Water infrastructure projects, Mongolia
30. Rogun Hydropower Station, Tajikistan
31. Tampur Dam Project, Indonesia
32. Turgusun HPP, 24.9 MW, Kazakhstan
33. Mining and processing complex at the Bogutinskoye tungsten ore deposit, Kazakhstan
34. Batang Toru Dam, Indonesia
35. East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) and the Associated Tilenga and Kingfisher Oil Fields, Uganda and Tanzania
36. Simlong Energy Industrial Park Project, Philippines
37. Greater Tortue Ahmeyim Project, Mauritania and Senegal

附录 2: 项目简介

1. Dabar Hydropower Plant¹²

Key project developers and/or contractors: Hidroelektrana Dabar d.o.o., a subsidiary of Elektroprivreda Republike Srpske, which is a public utility owned by the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Financiers: Export-Import Bank of China

Sector: Energy – Hydropower

Status: Financing agreement signed

Location: Bosnia and Herzegovina

The massive Upper Horizons scheme would decrease the flow of the river Neretva, whose delta in Croatia is already suffering from salination. As an important agricultural area, this in itself is a massive impact. It would also further decrease the amount of water available for the Hutovo Blato wetland Ramsar site, already being dried out by the existing Čapljina hydropower plant. The project would also involve closing a large sinkhole in the Nevesinjsko karst field, which may endanger the water flow to the iconic Buna, Bunica and Bregava rivers that are of absolutely crucial importance to towns like Blagaj and Stolac as well as being home to protected species such as the soft-mouthed trout.

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- Ante Šunjić, “Republika Srpska angažirala Kineze za gradnju HE Dabar, dolina Neretve ostaje bez dvije milijarde kubika slatke vode!”, Dubrovački Vjesnik, 7 January 2022. <https://dubrovacki.slobodnadalmacija.hr/dubrovnik/zupanija/neretva/republika-srpska-angazarala-kineze-za-gradnju-he-dabar-dolina-neretve-ostaje-bez-dvije-milijarde-kubika-slatke-vode-1157349>

¹² The Dabar hydropower plant is part of the Upper Horizons complex consisting of: the Dabar - 160 MW, Nevesinje - 60 MW, and Bileća - 32 MW.

2. Erdeneburen Dam

Key project developers/contractors: PowerChina

Financiers: Export-Import Bank of China

Sector: Energy – Hydropower

Status: Agreement

Location: Mongolia

The proposed 90MW Erdeneuren Dam in Mongolia is to be sited in Tsambagarav Uul National Park, which is also recognized as a protected wetland under the Ramsar Convention. If built, the dam would lead to host of negative biodiversity impacts on endangered species such as snow leopards and swan goose, among others. In addition to negative biodiversity impacts, local communities and even government officials have protested the dam for its impacts of dispossessing pastoral and nomadic communities of their livelihoods.

Further Information

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- Bolor Lkhaajav, “China-Financed Hydroelectric Power Plant Faces Popular Opposition in Mongolia”, The Diplomat, August 24, 2022.
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- “Erdeneburen hydropower plant project, Mongolia”, Environmental Justice Atlas, Updated October 10, 2022. <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/erdeneburen-hydropower-plant-project-mongolia>
- “Mongolian Government Seeks to Criminalize Citizens Opposing Erdeneburen Dam Project”, Rivers Without Boundaries, September 2, 2022.
<https://www.transrivers.org/2022/3754/>

3. Ghana Integrated Bauxite Development Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: Sinohydro and others to be determined¹³

Financiers: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, or any other bank that the creditor may select¹⁴

Sector: Mining

Status: Preparation

Location: Ghana

The iconic Atewa Forest is one of Ghana's last remaining intact forests and home to several endemic and critically endangered species such as the White-naped Mangabey and Afia Birago Puddle Frog. Any habitat loss is very likely to cause their extinction. Local dissent is strong: the forest communities do not want the bauxite mining as it would pollute their water, land and clean air, and cause loss of livelihoods, but they have not been consulted. The forest is also a critical watershed providing clean water daily to over 5 million Ghanaians: the proposed mining location on Atewa's mountaintops would pollute this vital water source with toxic heavy metals. The Atewa Range Forest Reserve is a Key Biodiversity Area.

Further Information:

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<https://ghana.arocha.org/resources/download-atewa-teeb-report-policy-brief/>
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- "New species to science discovered in Atewa Range Forest Reserve", A Rocha Ghana, July 8, 2021. <https://ghana.arocha.org/news/new-species-to-science-discovered-in-atewa-range-forest-reserve/>
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¹³ According to the Master Project Support Agreement (MPSA), Sinohydro agreed to arrange one or more loan facilities to cover 85% of the costs of Priority Projects, in which Sinohydro will construct for the government of Ghana in exchange for bauxite. Although Sinohydro is noted as an arranger of the projects, the Ghanaian government is still seeking a partner for the actual mining.

<http://ir.parliament.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/1279/BILLION%20CORPORATION.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

¹⁴ According to the MPSA, ICBC or any other bank that the creditor may select may be approached for financing bauxite mining.

<http://ir.parliament.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/1279/BILLION%20CORPORATION.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

- "Scores march against bauxite mining in Atewa Forest". Ghana News Online. 21 January 2020. <https://ghananewsonline.com.gh/scores-march-against-bauxite-mining-in-atewa-forest/>

4. Koukoutamba Dam

Key project developers and/or contractors: The Organisation for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) and PowerChina (EPC contractor)

Financiers: Export–Import Bank of China - *Pending*

Sector: Energy – Hydropower

Status: Agreement

Location: Guinea

The Koukoutamba Dam would be built within and have severe adverse impacts on the Moyon Bafing National Park, which was established in 2017 to protect an important stronghold for the critically endangered Western chimpanzee. The national park is home to the single largest population of the Western chimpanzee, a sub-species whose population has declined by 80% in the last 25 years. If built, the Koukoutamba Dam could result in the deaths of up to 1500 chimpanzees within the national park.

Further Information:

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- “Sinohydro to build the 294 MW Koukoutamba dam in Guinea”, The International Journal on Hydropower & Dams, March 13 2019. <https://www.hydropower-dams.com/news/sinohydro-to-build-the-294-mw-koukoutamba-dam-in-guinea/>

5. Thar Coal Block-I Mine & Power Plant (2x66MW)

Key project developers and/or contractors: Sino Sindh Resources Limited (SSRL, a subsidiary of Shanghai Electric Group); Shanghai Electric Engineering Design Company Limited and Shanghai Electric Hong Kong International Engineering Company Limited (subsidiaries of Shanghai Electric Group) as engineering procurement, and construction contractors; CCTEG Shenyang Engineering Company (a subsidiary of China Coal Technology Engineering Group) as design contractor

Financiers: China Development Bank, Export–Import Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and Habib Bank are supporting the power plant. ICBC is supporting the coal mine development.

Sector: Energy – Coal Power/Development

Status: Under construction

Location: Pakistan

Development of coal mining and construction of a coal power plant in the ecologically sensitive Thar desert region is being supported by Chinese banks and companies. As an open pit mine, Thar Coalfield Bloc-I involves massive excavations, in which the removed soil is dumped on the surface. Once the coal resources are fully exploited, the pit will be closed by depositing the excavated soil therein, which dramatically disturbs the natural, local geology formed over millennia, causing disastrous impacts on the local ecosystem in the long term.

The Thar desert is home to drought resilient flora and fauna. The local plant species, having deep roots that tap aquifers, can survive even the harshest and most prolonged droughts. Many of these drought-resilient plant species provide fodder for livestock—a major source of livelihood for local population. The entire process of massive coalmining, excavations of mines and closing of pits is likely to disturb the roots of these plants, which may result in their extinction. In addition, the extensive water usage by both the coal mine and the power plant, disposal of brine from the mine, and effluent discharged from the power plant will undermine the fragile hydrology, contaminate groundwater, and create a serious water crisis in Thar.

Further Information:

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6. Project Gran Buriticá S.A.S.¹⁵

Key project developers and/or contractors: Zijin-Continental Group, a subsidiary of Zijin Mining Group

Financiers: Unknown

Sector: Mining - gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc

Status: Operational

Location: Colombia

The Buriticá project is Colombia's first large-scale underground gold mining project with an expected 14-year life span. Ever since it became operational, social and environmental conflicts deepened. The community, with a large population of children and the elderly and have been affected by the growth of informal mining, have raised serious environmental impacts due to mercury and cyanide contamination, and high consumption of water to keep the project running. The impacted community has also denounced impacts on their health, freedom of movement, and right to live in a healthy and peaceful environment.

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¹⁵ This project is also known as the Buriticá mine.

7. Mirador Large-scale Mining Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: Ecuacorriente S.A. (ECSA) is owned by CRCC-Tongguan, which in turn is jointly owned by China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) and Tongling Nonferrous Metal Group (TNMG)

Financiers: China Development Bank, Bank of China, Export-Import Bank of China, Mercantile Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

Sector: Mining – copper, gold, and silver

Status: Operational

Location: Ecuador

Mirador is the first large-scale open-pit mining project in Ecuador. It is located in one of the most biodiverse areas in Ecuador's southern Amazon - the "Condor Mountain Range", which is home to a number of Indigenous peoples. A number of issues related to this project have been raised, including the infringement of the rights to Free, Prior and Informed Consent, housing, and to living in a healthy environment. This has also encouraged persecution, harassment, and criminalization of community leaders. The main environmental impacts include the contamination of rivers, deforestation and irreversible pollution of the ecosystem.

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8. San Carlos-Panantza Mining Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: ExplorCobres S.A. (EXSA), owned by the Chinese companies CRCC Tongguan Investment Co. Ltd., Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group Holdings Co. Ltd., and China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC)

Financiers: Bank of China, China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, China Merchants Bank, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.

Sector: Mining - copper and molybdenum

Status: Stalled

Location: Ecuador

The San Carlos-Panantza copper mining project comprises an open-pit mine of 38,548 hectares in the southern Amazon of Ecuador. It is estimated that 70% of the territory of the Shuar Arutam People is under concession for this project, which may affect 47 community centers – which impacts around 1,200 families. In 2016, various Indigenous families were forcibly evicted from their homes causing a humanitarian crisis, jeopardizing the tenure of the lands that make up the ancestral territory of the Shuar Arutam People. In November 2022, the Constitutional Court withdrew the Environmental License for the project.

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9. Río Blanco Mining Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: Ecuagoldmining South America, which is owned by the Chinese company Junefield Group S.A.

Financiers: Unknown

Sector: Mining - gold

Status: Stalled

Location: Ecuador

The Río Blanco gold mining project is located nearby the Macizo del Cajas Biosphere Reserve and the Cajas National Park's buffer zone. Local communities allege the company's land acquisitions are illegal, and Río Blanco community leaders and human rights defenders have reported harassment and intimidation by the national police and military forces. In 2018, a local court ordered the project's seizure due to lack of compliance with the Indigenous communities' right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent. Local opposition has led to the project stalling, in which the Chinese company withdrew without reparation measures or ensuring a responsible exit. Despite intense controversy, there is the possibility that the project may still continue in the future.

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10. Las Bambas Mining Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: Minerals and Metals Group MMG Limited, Guoxin International Investment Co. Ltd., CITIC Metal Co. Ltd.

Financiers: China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Bank of China

Sector: Mining – copper

Status: Operational

Location: Peru

Las Bambas, located in the high Andean areas of southern Peru, is one of the most important copper mines in Latin America. Acquired by a Chinese consortium in 2014, it is the largest overseas acquisition of mining assets by any Chinese entity at the time. The project has caused environmental and human health problems, due to noise and dust pollution. Indigenous and farming communities affected by the project have suffered from the excessive use of force by the Peruvian national police that has resulted in deaths, injuries, and arbitrary arrests of several community members. Since its operations began local protests over the project's socio-economic and environmental impacts have caused major production suspensions.

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11. Marcona Mine

Key project developers and/or contractors: Shougang Hierro Perú S.A.A, a subsidiary of Shougang Corporation

Financiers: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and DBS Bank Hong Kong

Sector: Mining

Status: Operational

Location: Peru

The Marcona mining project, located approximately 420 kilometers southeast of Lima, is the only large-scale iron ore mine currently in operation in the country and has been sending all its production to China for 30 years. It is one of the most conflictive mining projects in the country and has accumulated lawsuits for numerous labor rights violations. The mine takes up about 40% of the area of the municipality of Marcona, which causes overcrowding and a lack of access to services for the population in the urban area. Additionally, sea contamination and health impacts have been reported in other facilities of the mining complex.

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12. Toromocho Mining Unit

Key project developers and/or contractors: Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), owner of Minera Chinalco Perú S.A. (Chinalco Peru)

Financiers: China Development Bank, and Export-Import Bank of China

Sector: Mining - copper

Status: Operational

Location: Peru

The Toromocho mining project is one of the largest mining investments in the history of Peru. Since 2012 the project has relocated approximately 1,200 families and people have lost their livelihoods and jobs. Chinalco has failed to comply with agreements set with the community regarding the generation of jobs for resettled families. In addition, there are environmental problems regarding rivers and lakes contamination and water supply, which is expected to worsen as the mine expands.

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13. Santa Cruz River Hydroelectric Complex¹⁶

Key project developers and/or contractors: China Gezhouba Group Corporation in association with Hidrocuyo S.A. and Electroingeniería S.A.

Financiers: China Development Bank (CDB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Bank of China

Sector: Energy – Hydropower

Status: Under construction since 2015

Location: Argentina

The Santa Cruz River Hydroelectric Complex is the third most important hydroelectric complex in Argentina. It is also viewed as the most expensive to be financed and built by Chinese entities. Due to its location in the fragile Patagonian ecosystem, the project will likely impact the third-largest ice expanse in the world, threatening glacier movements and endemic wildlife. The project will induce impacts on the life and culture of 14 Indigenous communities in the area, such as the Tehuelche-Mapuche Indigenous peoples, and threatens their access to water in future generations. Currently, environmental organizations and Indigenous communities are taking legal action to stop the project.

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¹⁶ The name of this project has changed several times. Previous names include the Kirchner–Cepernic Hydroelectric Complex and then the Cóndor Cliff–Barrancosa Hydroelectric Complex.

14. Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: Cocasinclair EP, Sinohydro Corporation (contractor)

Financiers: Export-Import Bank of China

Sector: Energy – Hydropower

Status: Operational

Location: Ecuador

The Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric project is the largest and most expensive infrastructure project in Ecuador's history. The project is located in the Coca River Basin in the Amazonian region. The lack of due diligence, and technical, social, and environmental studies since the project's beginning affected the construction and operation of the plant and has caused irreversible environmental damage in the river basin, including changes in ecological water flows, the disappearance of the San Rafael Waterfall, and regressive erosion processes. The integrity of homes, livelihoods, and the right to health, food, among others, have thus been threatened.

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15. Ivirizu Hydroelectric Project

Key project developers/ contractors: Sinohydro Corporation Limited (contractor)

Financiers: Unknown

Sector: Energy – Hydropower

Status: In construction

Location: Bolivia

The Ivirizu Hydroelectric Project involves the construction of two hydroelectric power plants. As the first hydroelectric project to be built in a national protected area in Bolivia, the construction of the respective 180 MW and 74 MW hydroelectric power plants have affected more than 280 hectares of forest within the Carrasco National Park, which includes the habitat of several endangered species of flora and fauna. The project will likely affect 18 peasant communities in the area. In addition, development of the project has driven deforestation in the area, in which the hydroelectric plants' access roads have been used for the illegal entry of coca leaf growers. As a result, the fragile balance of the Carrascos ecosystem and the stability of the communities may lead to significant negative risks.

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16. São Manoel Hydroelectric Dam

Key project developers and/or contractors: China Three Gorges

Financiers: China Development Bank

Sector: Energy – Hydropower

Status: Operational

Location: Brazil

The Sao Manuel dam is the first 'greenfield' hydroelectric project in Brazil with Chinese capital. It is located on the Teles Pires River, a principal tributary of the Tapajós River in the Brazilian Amazon. Since its construction the project has faced opposition for its irreversible impacts on water quality, death of animals, deforestation, and the livelihoods of local communities. The construction of the dam has led to a decline in freshwater species, including the fish and turtles that are central to local diets. The decline in fish has severely impacted fishermen, who have reported fish catches plummeting to as low as 15% of their catch compared to the years before the dam. The area where the São Manoel Dam was built has been inhabited by Indigenous peoples, including the Munduruku, Kayabi and Apiaká, for millennia. For instance, it is located just 700 meters from the Kayabi Indigenous Territory; this area includes the Indigenous sacred site *Dekoka'a*, which is of incalculable importance to Indigenous cosmology.

Further Information:

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17. Rucalhue Hydroelectric Power Plant

Key project developers and/or contractors: China International Water & Electric

Financiers: Unknown

Sector: Energy – Hydropower

Status: Construction

Location: Chile

The Rucalhue project is the first Chinese investment in the Chilean hydropower sector. It is intended to be the fourth hydroelectric plant to be installed on the Biobío River, a highly environmentally sensitive area, where hydroelectric projects have already caused negative cumulative impacts on water quality, the flow regime, and the habitat of species in the area. According to the project's Environmental Impact Study, the dammed area will be at least 7.7 kilometers long, affecting an area of unique environmental value in a region inhabited by more than 1.5 million people. Since the construction began, the project has caused deforestation and social conflicts. Local communities and civil society organizations report affected Indigenous people were denied their right to Free, Prior, and Informed consent, and the right to a healthy environment.

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18. Ishpingo Oilfield, Block 43- ITT

Key project developers and/or contractors: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Chuanqing Drilling Engineering Company Limited (contractor)

Financiers: Unknown

Sector: Energy - Oil

Status: Exploitation

Location: Ecuador

The Block #43 is known as ITT, which includes the oil fields of Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini. It is the largest crude oil reserve in Ecuador. It extends over almost 2,000 hectares in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 100 of which lie inside the Yasuní National Park, a biodiversity hotspot designated as a biosphere reserve by UNESCO in 1989. Of the three fields that make up the ITT, Ishpingo is the most sensitive and high risk area due to presence of Indigenous peoples who live in this territory, as well as for the potential environmental and biodiversity impacts on the Yasuní ecosystem itself. CNPC has operated in the ITT since 2018. This year, it has begun exploiting the Ishpingo field, resulting in rampant deforestation and social-environmental conflicts among local communities and local defenders.

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19. Orinoco Oil Belt

Key project developers and/or contractors: Sinovensa, which is a joint venture by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)

Financier: China Development Bank

Sector: Oil

Status: Operational

Location: Venezuela

The Orinoco Oil Belt extends over a 55,000 km² area and encompasses around 20% of the world's oil resources. It is a globally important wetland, an area of high biodiversity, and a critical habitat to numerous endangered species. In addition, the Orinoco River is one of the lushest rivers in South America and the world. Historically, there is very limited access to information on the socio-environmental performance of Sino-Venezuelan oil companies. However, since 2018 fires and oil spills have been reported which affect the environment and livelihood of the communities, their agricultural production, and drinking water quality. Issues associated with the infringement of the right to previous consultation, a healthy environment, and to respect the traditional lands of Indigenous communities have also been raised.

Further Information:

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20. Mayan Train Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), Mota-Engil México¹⁷, among others

Financiers: Mexican development Bank Banobras and potentially others

Sector: Railway transport

Status: Construction

Location: Mexico

The Mayan Train is the Mexican Federal government's largest public transportation facility, consisting of 1,554 kilometers of railroad tracks that will cross five states in the south-southeast of the country. Once functional, the line will connect a complex of extractive industries such as wind farms, hydroelectric plants, palm oil agrofuel plants, gas pipelines, hydrocarbon exploration projects, among others. It will cross along a corridor inhabited by hundreds of Indigenous communities and very important ecosystems such as the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve, the largest forest reserve in Mexico. Indigenous and local communities have raised concerns on the environmental impacts, lack of transparency, violation of the rights to previous consultation, healthy environment, housing (due to displacements), among others.

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21. Dumestre Hydrobiological Resources Processing Plant

Key project developers and/or contractors: Australis Seafoods S.A, which is owned by the Chinese company Joyvio Group

Financiers: Unknown

Sector: Aquaculture - Salmon farming

Status: Construction completed, to be operational in December 2022

Location: Chile

The Dumestre Salmon Processing Plant is an industrial mega-complex with a seven hectares extension in Patagonia. Due to its environmental and social impacts, the project faces huge opposition from broad sectors in Chile. Local authorities and communities have raised numerous irregularities with the plant such as the lack of transparency, and insufficient environmental studies. The plant is estimated to produce more than 23,000 cubic meters of industrial liquid waste per day, use electrical energy equivalent to 20% of homes in Natal, the vehicular traffic associated with the plant will increase by 200 trips and there will be about 12,000 less liters of water for the communities due to the requirements that the plant will have.

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22. Project Name: Dairi Prima Mineral Mine

Project developer: PT. Dairi Prima Mineral (DPM) is a subsidiary of China Nonferrous Metal Industry's Foreign Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. (NFC). NFC is the majority owner of the mine and responsible for the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) of the mine.

Financiers: Unconfirmed

Sector: Mining

Status: Construction

Location: Dairi Regency, North Sumatra Province, Indonesia

The mine is located at the head of a river system inhabited by 11 Indigenous villages. Habitats of endangered species such as orangutans has been identified downstream of the mine, in which the distance of the mine to the closest village is less than 1 kilometer. Located in an area with some of the highest earthquake risks in the world, there is a high potential for catastrophic collapse of the proposed Tailings Storage Facility; if the tailings facility collapses, it could result in hundreds of lives lost, as well as damage more than 200 kilometers of the river system. The mine and tailings facility also presents risks to surface and ground water from acidic drainage and sediment, with high concentrations of dissolved metals.

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23. Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park

Key project developers and/or contractors: Shanghai Decent Investment (Group) Company Limited (a subsidiary of Tsingshan Holding Group Company Limited); PT Bintang Delapan Group; and PT Sulawesi Mining Investment

Financiers: China Development Bank, Export–Import Bank of China, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), HSBC China

Sector: Nickel mining

Status: Operational

Location: Indonesia

With the rise of nickel mining and the processing industry in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, communities living nearby have suffered from a new wave of land grabbing and have seen their human rights undermined, as the area has been developed for industry. Environmental pollution and the degradation of the coastal marine environment next to the nickel mining areas has caused issues for surrounding communities. As the river mouth is now covered with mud and sedimentation, fisherfolks, not able to dock fishing boats near their homes, can only go fishing during high tide, and have to travel farther and longer, yet with fewer catches and higher logistics costs. Equally concerning are the labour rights abuses, including lack of decent wages, excessive overtime and occupational health and safety concerns, which has been reported by workers employed by companies operating at the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park.

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24. Amazarsky Saw and Paper Mill and Loguhe-Pokrovka Border Crossing

Key project developers and/or contractors: Heilongjiang Xingbang Guoji, Heilongjiang Longxin Co.

Financier: China Development Bank

Sector: Pulp and Paper

Status: Stalled

Location: Russia

The project planned on logging three million hectares is in the last remaining areas of primary biodiversity rich boreal forests situated along the Sino-Russian border and build roads to fragment and ease access to this sensitive wilderness area accelerating habitat and biodiversity loss. Developing a reservoir for industrial water supply on Amazar River affected population of endangered Siberian Taimen, the largest salmonid in the world. In addition, logging operations and new roads will threaten the traditional land use of local communities and Evenki Indigenous people. Since 2013, local scientists, activists, and communities have fought to stop the project due to its negative environmental, social, and biodiversity impacts. They are now calling for the area to become a protected due to its rich biodiversity, and are also calling for the removal of a dam already built on the Amazar River as it is legally non-compliant.

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25. Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant and Kidunda Dam Water Supply Project

Key project developers and/or contractors:

- *For the Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant:* Tanzania Electric Supply Company, PowerChina, Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group Co. Ltd., Dongfang Electric Corporation, Arab Contractors LLC
- *For the Kidunda Dam:* Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority, PowerChina (contractor)

Financiers:

- For the Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant:* Unconfirmed
- For the Kidunda Dam:* Concessional loan from China

Sector: Energy – Hydropower and water supply

Status: Construction

Location: Tanzania

The Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant project (also known as Stiegler’s Gorge Dam) is located along the Rufiji River in the iconic Selous Game Reserve, a UNESCO World Heritage site and home to black rhino, elephants and other threatened species. The project would irrevocably damage the outstanding universal value of the Selous Game Reserve by destroying critical habitat for endangered species, as well as negatively impacting Ramsar wetlands downstream to the project. The Egyptian EPC contractors signed a nearly US\$1 billion sub-contract with PowerChina in 2019. Additional contracts signed with Dongfang Electric and other Chinese companies.

Kidunda Dam is expected to negatively impact the flow of water in Rufiji River, and thus eventually affect the flora and fauna in the Selous Game Reserve World Heritage site. Its reservoir will flood part of its territory adding to damage caused by the Julius Nyerere Hydropower Plant. Both dams have been opposed by the UNESCO World Heritage Centre and IUCN.

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26. Northern Sea Route Oil, Gas, and Mining Projects

Key project developers and/or contractors:

- *Yamal LNG and Arctic-2 LNG projects*: Novatek, China National Petroleum Corporation, China National Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd, Total, Chinese Offshore Oil Engineering Co.

- *Taimyr Coal project*: VostokUgol, Coal India Limited

- *Arctic Oil projects*: Gazpromneft co., Rosneft corp.

- *Arctic shipping and shipbuilding*: Zvezda Shipyard, China State Shipbuilding Corporation, Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard, Rosatomflot, COSCO Ltd., China Nonferrous Metal Industry's Foreign Engineering and Construction, Kaz Minerals Co.

Financiers: Silk Road Fund, China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, Russian National Wealth Fund, Sberbank and Gazprombank, and other sources.

Sector: Energy, Mining, Transportation

Status: Operation, construction, and exploration

Location: Russia

The Russian “Northern Sea Route” Program involves developing shipping lines for transporting products from several gas, oil, coal and copper projects in the Arctic. Projects include the Yamal LNG, Arctic-2 LNG projects, Taimyr Coal project, Baimskaya copper mine and Arctic shipping and shipbuilding investments.

The Arctic is an extremely sensitive and at-risk ecosystem due to climate change. Mineral extraction in the region thus threatens fragile Arctic terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Port construction threatens coastal fisheries and bird rookeries. Shipping increases the likelihood of oil and fuel spills. The extraction, transportation, and burning of fossil fuels in the area causes pollution which cannot be mitigated due to ice conditions. Furthermore, permafrost thaw increases the risk of releasing infectious diseases stored in the ice for centuries.

Environmental groups have called for a freeze on fossil fuel-related development on and off the coast of Arctic Ocean. Indigenous peoples of Chukotka have also protested port construction at Cape Nagleynyn for shipping of Baimskaya copper ore.

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27. Power of Siberia-II (Soyz-Vostok) Gas Pipeline (Pipeline Russia-Mongolia-China)

Key project developers and/or contractors: Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation

Financiers: Unconfirmed

Sector: Energy – Gas transportation

Status: Planning

Location: Russia-Mongolia-China

The Power of Siberia-II Gas Pipeline was backed by the governments of all three countries in 2018. However, the pipeline may affect high biodiversity areas, including fragmenting and destroying areas like World Heritage sites, Russia's Tunkinsky National Park, and vast pristine grassland ecosystems in Mongolia. Affected peoples, including Indigenous herders, have not been properly consulted according to the principles of Free, Prior Informed Consent.

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28. Zashulansky Coal Mine

Key project developers and/or contractors: Razrezugol LLC, Shenhua (China Energy Investment Corporation), EN+ Group

Financiers: Russian government financing and undisclosed financiers

Sector: Energy and Mining

Status: Construction

Location: Russia

The Zashulansky Coal Mine is being developed by Razrezugol LLC, a joint venture between EN+ Group and Shenhua. The project and associated infrastructure threaten to fragment primary forests known for high biodiversity. The project will also degrade existing local roads due to increase in coal transportation, and cross a protected area safeguarding mineral water springs. Significantly, key project developers did not conduct any consultations based on Free, Prior and Informed Consent principles. As a result, local community leaders have been calling to stop the project.

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29. “Blue Horse” Program of Mongolia

Key project developers/ contractors:

- *Egiin Gol Hydroelectric Dam*: China Gezhouba, Tractebel Engineering
- *Kherlen-Gobi and Orkhon-Onggi water transfer projects*: Erdenes-Mongol Co., Prestige Group, and other unconfirmed developers

Financiers: Export-Import Bank of China, Mongolian government funding, and other international sources

Sector: Energy and Water Supply

Status:

- *Egiin Gol Hydro* – Stalled
- *Kherlen-Gobi and Orkhon-Onggi water transfer projects* : planning

Location: Mongolia

The “Blue Horse” Program includes five large and more than 25 medium-sized water infrastructure projects. The program plans for building 33 dams on 12 rivers of Mongolia. Collectively, the projects threaten three World Heritage and ten Ramsar sites, blocking fish migration, and dewatering key rivers and protected wetlands along East-Asian-Australasian Flyway. If built, the dams would likely create transboundary tensions with China (via the Kherlen River) and Russia (via the Selenge River and Ulz River).

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30. Rogun Hydropower Station

Key project developers and/or contractors: Rogun Hydro, Salini Impregilo (Webuild), Sinohydro 16th Bureau/PowerChina

Financiers: Tajikistan Government, negotiating additional funding with Bank of China and China Export Credit Insurance Corporation, AIIB, World Bank.

Sector: Energy - Hydropower

Status: Construction

Location: Tajikistan

The dam will likely exacerbate if not trigger transboundary conflicts, threaten downstream agricultural communities, and disrupt hydro-ecological balance in the Aral Sea Basin. The dam will interrupt flows and degrade floodplain forests in the “Tiger Gorge” nature reserve (IUCN category I) and may contribute to extinction of critically endangered Amu-Darya false shovelnose sturgeon. It will also necessitate involuntary resettlement of up to 35,000 people. Given the increasing project costs, it may increase the country’s foreign debt, which may prevent the country exploring better development alternatives.

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31. Tampur Dam Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: PT. Kamirzu

Financiers: China Minsheng Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, other international financiers

Sector: Energy - Hydropower

Status: Stalled

Location: Indonesia

The 430 MW Tampur Dam project is located in the heart of the Leuser Ecosystem, one of the largest and most biodiverse forest ecosystems in Southeast Asia, spanning across Aceh and North Sumatra provinces. The Leuser Ecosystem is internationally recognized for its outstanding biodiversity and primary tropical forests, and is part of Gunung Leuser National Park, one of three national parks which collectively comprise the Tropical Rainforest Heritage of Sumatra, a World Heritage Site. The Tampur Dam area contains key elephant corridors that connects the elephant population in Gunung Leuser National Park to the forests of North Sumatra; it also contains critical habitat for numerous endangered species such as Sumatran tiger, orangutan, rhino, among other charismatic species. In March 2019, WALHI Aceh filed a lawsuit to Banda Aceh State Administrative Court and the court deemed it illegal for the Aceh Government to issue the permit to use forest lands for dam construction.

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32. Turgusun-1 Hydropower Plant

Key project developers and/or contractors: Turgusun-1 Company, China International Water & Electric Corporation (contractor and supplier)

Financiers: Baiterek National Managing Holding JSC through Development Bank of Kazakhstan JSC and its subsidiaries

Sector: Energy - Hydropower

Status: Operational

Location: Kazakhstan

The 24.9 MW Turgusun-1 Hydropower Plant (HPP) may have a negative impact on the ecosystem of the Turgusun River and the population of Siberian Taimen (*Hucho taimen*) by fragmenting its habitat and blocking migration. It is the largest representative of salmon fish in the world, which is listed in the Red Book of Kazakhstan and the IUCN. In the coming years, it is planned to build two more hydroelectric power plants on the Turgusun River with a capacity of 45 MW and 100 MW.

Further Information:

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33. Mining and processing complex at the Bogutinskoye tungsten ore deposit¹⁸

Key project developers and/or contractors: China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, *China Railway Construction International Investment Group Corporation*

Financiers: China Merchants Bank

Sector: Mining

Status: Construction

Location: Kazakhstan

The project is located approximately two km from the border of the Charyn National Park and may have a negative impact on the state of the Charyn River and flora and fauna of the Charyn National Park. For example, if tailing dams fail during an earthquake, toxic substances may be released into Charyn and in turn to the Ile rivers – important habitat for endemic fish species. These risks have not been covered by the EIA report presented to public hearings.

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¹⁸ Also known as Kazakhstan Bakuta Tungsten Mine.

34. Batang Toru Dam

Key project developers and/or contractors: PowerChina

Financiers: SDIC Power Group

Sector: Energy - Hydropower

Status: Construction

Location: Indonesia

The Batang Toru Hydropower project is located in one of the most biodiverse, primary forests left in North Sumatra. The project's environmental impact assessment contained serious omissions and inaccurate information, including failing to recognize key critically endangered species such as the Tapanuli orangutan, in addition to a forged signature of one of the key experts in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Local communities have long opposed the dam development, and scientists have warned that the dam's development will lead to the extinction of the rarest great ape, the Tapanuli orangutan. The project has also been marred by the deaths of dam construction workers, as well as the mysterious death of an Indonesian lawyer who protested the dam. Despite controversy, SDIC Power Group has invested \$277mn in the Batang Toru Dam.

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35. East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) and the Associated Tilenga and Kingfisher Oil Fields

Key project developers and/or contractors: China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), TotalEnergies, Uganda National Oil Company, Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation

Financiers: Unconfirmed¹⁹

Sector: Energy - Oil Development and Transport

Status: Construction

Location: Uganda and Tanzania

The East African Crude Oil Pipeline is expected to disrupt nearly 2,000 square kilometres of protected wildlife habitat (Biharamulo Game Reserve and Wembere Steppe Key Biodiversity Area) and severely degrade approximately 500 square kilometres of important wildlife corridors for the endangered Eastern Chimpanzee and African Elephant. The pipeline poses a high risk of pollution to critical fresh water supplies, including Lake Victoria, the largest lake in Africa. At the port of Tanga, where the oil will be transferred offshore, two Ecologically or Biologically Significant Marine Areas (EBSAs)—which host Marine Protected Areas, Mangrove Forest Reserves, ecologically significant coral reefs and other wildlife—are at high risk of degradation. It also represents a massive new source of carbon emissions – estimated to be over 34 million metric tons per year.

The associated Tilenga and Kingfisher oil fields are located in the Albertine Graben, one of the richest natural habitats in the world, with Lake Albert being a transboundary lake of birding importance and part of the Murchison Falls-Albert Delta Wetland system, which was designated a Ramsar site in 2009. The Tilenga project entails drilling 130 oil wells within Murchison Falls National Park; while the Kingfisher project central processing facility and well pads are located within the sensitive area of Buhuka Flats and will increase the likelihood of oil spills and pollution in the area. In addition to biodiversity concerns, local communities and civil society activists criticize the project for disrupting livelihoods without prompt and adequate compensation and causing a range of other social impacts, especially Congolese communities who are also impacted but were not consulted.

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¹⁹ Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is reported to be one of the financial advisers and might potentially finance these projects.

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36. Simlong Energy Industrial Park Project

Key project developers and/or contractors: Simlong Energy Development Corp. (a subsidiary of Abacore Capital Holdings, China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering Co., Ltd. (a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation), China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd (a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company)

Project financiers: Unconfirmed

Sector: Energy – oil and gas complex (storage, transportation, refinery, power plant)

Status: Preparation

Location: Philippines

If pursued, the Simlong project will contribute to environmental degradation and habitat destruction such as ocean warming, vast land clearing, sedimentation due to land reclamation, potential destruction of coral reefs, degrading water quality⁵ – since it will promote the use and sale of fossil gas products. At this point, there are no clear details regarding whether the proponent has already obtained the consent and approval of the communities affected by the SEDCO project, as required by Philippine law.

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37. Greater Tortue Ahmeyim Project

Key project developers/contractors: BP plc, Kosmos Energy Ltd, Societe des Petroles du Senegal (PETROSEN), Societe Mauritanienne des Hydrocarbures (SMH), China Ocean Shipping Company (contractor)

Financiers: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)²⁰

Sector: Oil and gas

Status: Under Development

Location: Mauritania and Senegal

This cross-border offshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) project is the deepest offshore project in Africa to date. It will extract gas from ultra-deep wells at a water depth of 2850 meters, putting the world's largest cold-water reef and migratory bird populations at risk. Less than five km away from the planned terminal lies Mauritania's Dialing National Park, home to 250 different species of birds. The risk of oil spills are a major concern – a potential condensate oil spill could hit the coast of Mauritania and Senegal in less than a week, killing coastal animals and threatening the livelihoods of the people of Mauritania and Senegal.

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²⁰ The project is partially self-funded by the developers and ICBC is a financier of BP, providing a revolving credit facility.